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ANTHROPOLOGY  AND  LEGAL  THEORY
I WOULD  like  to  explore,  in  a  general  and  to  some  extent
tentative  fashion,  the  help  which  anthropology  may  provide
for  those inquiring  into  the  nature  of  law.  It  is necessary first  to
define the  material  relevant  to  the  inquiry.  Anthropologists  study
societies  of  widely  different  types.  From  the  Western  point  of
view they  are technologically  simple, with  agricultural  or  pastoral
economies. But  they  often  have complex  forms  of  social organisa-
tions,  and some have elaborate  political  structures.  On  the  whole
I have not found  relevant studies of societies with  forms  of  central
government.  This  is  because anthropologists  studying  them  have
not  had to  think  very  precisely  about  problems  of  the  nature  of
law. Problems, of  course, do arise, especially in  relation  to  what  is
often  called custom, that  is, a collection  of  rules not  derived from
the  enactments of  the  central  government  or  its  agencies.1  But  it
has been relatively  easy to  avoid problems of  the  " What  is law? "
type, because it  has seemed obvious that  there  is law in  the  enact-
ments of  the  chief  and the  decisions of  the  courts.  On  the  other
hand, studies of societies which  lack  central  government,  especially
those  which  lack  any  form  of  political  institution  (which  I  call
" simple "  societies),  are  relevant  to  my  inquiry.  There  are  two
reasons for  this:  (i)  if  the anthropologist  is interested at all  in  law
he is forced  to  give some attention  to  the  problem  of  classification
and determine  whether  and how  the  legal is to  be identified  in  a
situation  where the usual criteria  supplied by legislature and courts
are missing; (ii)  a study of these societies allows one to  discern the
minimum  forms  of  behaviour  that  need to  be observed if  a group
is to  be viable.  This  has important  implications  for  some versions
of natural  law.
These two  reasons supply the  theme  of  this  paper. First  I  con-
sider what  may be learnt  as to  the  operation  of  " law "  in  simple
societies. It  is  essential to  make  a  preliminary  distinction  which
may  seem obvious and  yet  is often  overlooked  or  not  sufficiently
observed.  This  is  the  distinction  between  the  external  and  the
internal  approach to  the  study  of  a society other  than  one.s own.
The  external  approach  may  be manifested  in  a number  of  ways.
At  its  most  extreme  it  takes the  form  of  the  application  to  the
1 Cf.  the  discussion  of  customary  law  in  I.  Hamnett,  Chieftainship  and  Legitimacy,
Chap.  1.
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society  under  investigation  of  a theory  of  law  formulated  in  the
context  of a different  society or culture.2 But  it  may take less overt
forms;  an  investigator  after  describing  the  social life  of  a people
may  use a  criterion  not  recognised by  the  people  themselves to
divide the legal from  the non-legal.3 The internal  approach is adopted
where an investigator,  working  without  preconceptions, attempts to
discover  the  classifications  which  members  of  the  society  use in
applying  normative  notions  to  behaviour.
There  is nothing  startling  in  the proposition  that  an investigator
of  a  society  different  from  his  own  should  adopt  the  internal
approach.  But  its  implications  require  some thought.  In  order  to
understand and make intelligible  the data he discovers, the investi-
gator  has to  use some concepts derived  from  his own  culture.  He
would  find  it  impossible to  avoid  altogether  the  words  " ought,"
" rule,"  " right  "  and  " duty."  The  point  is  that  such  words,
although  indispensable, need to  be used with  caution.  The  investi-
gator  must try  to  make  sure that  the word  he chooses to  describe
a state of  affairs  does not  convey an impression which  is mislead-
ing.  A  particular  danger arises with  the  use of  the  words  " rule,"
" right  "  and " duty."  These are terms with  which  the  investigator
is so familiar  from  his  own  culture  that  he  may  take  them  as a
self  -evident means of describing what he finds in the society investi-
gated. But  in  fact  these terms may not  be suitable, because of  the
implications  which  they  carry.  A  rule  implies  the  existence  of
conduct which  ought to be followed  where " ought "  has a manda-
tory  or  imperative  sense. Likewise  a  right  implies  strongly  that
one may  require  another  to  behave in  some particular  way,  and
duty  has a corresponding implication.  These terms  may be unsuit-
able for  application  to behaviour  observed in  simple societies, both
because of  their  strongly  imperative  overtones  and  because they
convey a sense of  a clearly  defined aspect of  behaviour  to  which  a
mandatory  " ought "  attaches.  If  one  says there  is  a  rule  which
requires X  to  be done,  or  that  people are under  a duty  to  do  X,
one  implies  that  the  range  of  behaviour  which  is  mandatory
(  expressed by  X)  is clearly  understood.
I  hope  I  can illustrate  what  I  mean from  the  way  in  which  a
2 A recent  interesting  example  is supplied  by S. Schlegel's  application  of Hart's rule
of recognition  theory  to the Tirurary, a Philippine  people:  Tirurary Justice  (1970).
3 B. Malinowski, for  example, in  his study of  the Trobriand  islanders uses both the
principle of  reciprocity and rules placing limits  on man's fundamental drives as criteria
of  law. See especially Crime and  Custom in  Savage Society, and his  introduction  to
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North  Alaskan  Eskimo  community  looks at dealing with  property.
Among  this  community  it  is  expected that  normally  one  person
will  not  take  or  destroy  another's  property.  Cases occur  in  which
A  believes rightly  or wrongly  that he has a grievance against B. To
work  off  the  grievance  A  may  destroy  some  valuable  piece  of
property  (a canoe) belonging  to  B.  A  typical  reaction  on the  part
of  B  is  to  take  no  steps against A,  but  to  proclaim  to  the  com-
munity  in  general  that  he  has  all  along  acted  properly.  He  is
satisfied if  he is able to get public  opinion  on his side. I  think  that
it  would  be  a  distortion  to  attribute  to  this  community  a  rule
requiring  people to  refrain  from  destroying  or  taking  the property
of  others, or  a rule  requiring  compensation or  return  if  another's
property  is taken  or  destroyed. One needs instead to  speak of  the
way in which  people are expected to behave, and to  recognise that
a  certain  degree  of  vagueness or  fluidity  attaches  to  what  is
expected. It  would  be misleading  to  impose a sharp  dividing  line
between behaviour  which  ought  to  be  observed with  respect  to
property  and that  which  ought  not  to  be observed, and to  describe
such behaviour  in  terms  of  rights  and duties.4
Once the  investigator  has completed his analysis and unravelled
so far  as he can the indigenous modes of  classification,  he will  be
faced with  a variety  of  behavioural  patterns  to  each of  which  an
" ought "  may  be attached.  In  some cases he  may  conclude  that
the  behaviour  forms  the  subject-matter  of  a  rule,  or  rights  and
duties, in  others that  the  " ought "  is less prescriptive  and justifies
a description  more in  terms of  expectations than  in  terms  of  rules
prescribing  behaviour.  Expectations  may  be,  and  commonly  are,
generated  by  rules.  But  these  need  to  be  distinguished  from
expectations  derived  from  the  belief  that  a  particular  form  of
behaviour  is proper  or appropriate.  His problem  is to  decide which
part  of his material  is to be classified as legal or as constituting  the
law.  To  solve the problem  he will,  I  suggest, have to  resort to  the
external  approach. In  other  words, the investigator  in  constructing
his  " test "  for  law  has to  take  into  account  matters  other  than
the conditions  of the society he has studied. But  he cannot  present
his test as self-evident;  he needs to  recognise the  fact  that  he has
adopted  an  external  approach,  and  to  give  reasons for  the  par-
ticular  approach adopted.
4 R.  F.  Spencer,  The  North  Alaskan  Eskimo,  pp.  97 et  seq. The  author  wisely  does not
use  the  language  of  "  rules,"  "  rights"  and  "  duties,"  although  he  does  speak  of
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Anthropologists  who  have  adopted  the  internal  approach  have
not,  it  seems, been fully  aware  of  the  problems  involved.5  It  is
difficult  for  anyone who has not  conducted fieldwork  to  judge the
accuracy  of  the  data presented, but  one cannot  escape a suspicion
that  some  of  the  complexities  arising  in  the  description  of
normatively-regarded  behaviour  have been overlooked.  There  does
not always seem to have been sufficient attention  paid to the distinc-
tion  between  rules  and  other  " ought "  statements  which,  with
little  violence  to  the  facts,  might  be used to  describe beliefs  and
evaluations  of  conduct.  Further,  when  applying  what  is  in  effect
an  externally-constructed  criterion  for  the  identification  of  law,
anthropologists  neither  make  clear  that  they  are  applying  an
external approach nor  give reasons to justify  the criterion  selected.
Thus  one  sometimes finds  an  anthropologist  taking  law  to  be  a
set of  rules deemed by the  members of  the  society to  be the  most
important.  Importance  is evidenced by the fact  that  the rules have
the  backing  of  the  whole  community.6  What  is happening  is that
the  anthropologist  takes rules  falling  within  one of  the  categories
he has found  operating  in  the  society and deems these to  be law.
But  he  has not  said why  such a  category  should  be  singled  out
as the hallmark  of law.
Suppose one wishes to  construct  a  theory  of  law  applicable  to
simple societies. One first  has to  conduct  an internal  investigation
designed to  uncover  the  indigenous  approaches  to  normatively-
regarded  behaviour.  This  will  yield  for  each society  investigated
information  on  the  extent  to  which  it  has  adopted  rules  which
prescribe  behaviour,  the  way  in  which  it  classifies such rules  and
the  varieties  of  behaviour  to  which  a  less prescriptive  " ought "
attaches.  The  investigation  will  necessarily  include  the  study  of
procedures  for  the  settlement  of  disputes,  since  it  is  through
disputes  that  reliable  information  relating  to  rules  and  other
" ought "  statements is  most  readily  obtained.  Once the  informa-
tion  has  been  gathered  the  investigator  will  have  to  adopt  an
external  approach,  and  select a  criterion  by  which  to  distinguish
the  legal  from  the  non-legal  phenomena  in  the  material  before
him.  His  most  difficult  task  will  be to  justify  the  criterion  which
he selects.
5  cf.  the  remarks  of  S.  Roberts,  "  Law  and  the  Study  of  Social  Control  in  Small-
Scale Societies"  (1976) 39 M.L.R.  667 et seq.
6  Cf.  D.  Tait,  The  Konkomba  of  Northern  Ghana,  pp.  62 et  seq,  141 et  seq., speaking
not  of  law  but  of"  jural  activities,"  "  quasi-Iegal  "  or"  para-legal  methods  ";  M.  Fortes,
Kinship  and  the  Social  Order,  p.  89;  J.  G.  Peristany,  "  Pokot  Sanctions  and  Structure  "
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It  is perhaps worth  considering some of  the  possible approaches
that might  be taken.  One approach is to  select the dispute process,
or  an  element  of  it,  as the  criterion  of  law.7 Although  there  is
some attraction  in  the  argument  that  the  way  in  which  a society
resolves its  conflicts  is  an  essential, if  not  the  essential, element
in law, there are reasons for  regarding this approach as inadequate.
The  problem  may  be  put  in  this  way:  why  should  a  procedure
for  the  settlement  of  disputes be singled  out  as the  hallmark  of
law?  The answer might  be that  the main task of  " law "  in  society
is to prevent and control  the outbreak  of  conflict  between members
of the society. If  this is not done the society is likely  to disintegrate.
Hence the procedures which  the  society evolves for  the  treatment
of  " trouble  cases  "  may properly  be called " law "  in  that  society.
An  answer  along  these  lines  is  not  entirely  satisfactory.  The
reason is that  insufficient  attention  is paid to  the  rules or  expecta-
tions  regarding  behaviour  current  within  the  society.  This  is
obvious in  those versions of  the  dispute approach  which  seeks to
locate  law  in  the  actual  decisions  of  the  person  resolving  the
dispute. But  even the more flexible theories which stress the need to
consider  the  whole  history  of  a  dispute  are  still  too  narrowly
based. They  recognise that  a  dispute  arises because people think
that  they have not  received their  due, or  that  others have behaved
wrongly  towards  them.  To  understand  the  cause of  the  dispute,
the investigator  has to establish the standards of behaviour  accepted
by the  society and determine  the degree of  " obligation  "  attached
to  them.  In  establishing these standards the investigator  of  dispute
processes has  collected  part  of  the  material  which  needs to  be
scrutinised  before  a  judgment  on  the  nature  of  law  within  the
society can be made. The difficulty  lies in the fact  that  investigators
of  dispute  processes are  generally  more  interested  in  giving  an
account  of  the  relationship  of  the  parties  than  in  examining  the
way in  which  the  society evaluates conduct  to  which  an " ought "
is attached. One can see the reason for  the emphasis on the actual
course of the dispute. If  one wishes to investigate the rules or other
7 For  a variety  of  approaches,  see A.  L.  Epstein,  "  The  Case Method  in  the  Field  of
Law,"  in  Epstein,  The  Craft  of  Social  Anthropology,  p.  205;  P.  H.  Gulliver,  "  Case
Studies  of  Law  in  Non-Western  Societies  "  (Introduction),  in  L.  Nader,  Law  in  Culture
and  Society,  p.  11;  K.  F.  Koch,  "  Law  and  Anthropology:  Notes  on  Interdisciplinary
Research  "  (1969)  4  Law  and  Society  Review  11;  V.  W.  Turner,  "  Law,  Primitive,"  in
New  Catholic  Encyclopaedia;  N.  Tanner,  "  Disputing  and the  Genesis of  Legal  Principles:
Examples  from  Minangkabon"  (1970)  26  Southwestern  Journal  of  Anthropology  375;
L.  Pospisil,  Anthropology  of  Lay",  Chaps.  2,  3;  G.  Cochrane,  "  Legal  Decisions  and
Processual Models  of  Law  "  (1972) 7 Man  (N.S.) 50.221 ANTHROPOLOGY  AND  LEGAL  THEORY
" ought "  statements accepted by a society it  is natural  to start with
a dispute.  A  situation  in  which  people have quarrelled  about  the
behaviour  either  has  observed or  failed  to  observe towards  the
other  is likely  to focus sharply on such rules as either  party  alleges
the  other  has not  observed. Yet  the  fact  of  the  quarrel  provides
merely  an  appropriate  start  to  an  investigation  of  normatively-
regarded behaviour.  Where  the  main  object  of  the  investigation  is
the nature  of law, the emphasis should be on the manner  in  which
conduct is evaluated within  the society and not on the circumstances
which  give  rise  to  particular  disputes and  the  methods  by  which
they are resolved.
A  better  approach is to cast one's net more widely,  and consider
the rules and  other  " ought "  statements accepted by  a society. If,
for  the  moment,  one concentrates  on  rules, can one say that  the
rules  which  the  members of  a  particular  society  regard  as most
important  constitute  law  for  that  society?  An  obvious  difficulty
is  the  selection  of  a  criterion  by  which  to  determine  degrees of
importance.  One is unlikely  to find  within  a society a neat division
of  rules into  those regarded by the society as important  and those
regarded as of  significantly  less importance.  Certainly  one can look
at the way the society employs sanctions for  breach, and conclude
that  the  most  important  rules  are those which  engage the  whole
society  in  their  maintenance.  This  looks  well  in  theory,  but  in
practice even an anthropologist  might  find it  extraordinarily  difficult
to determine when the society as such is operating  a sanction.
A  different  standpoint  might  be adopted, and one might  look  at
the  advantages of  a criterion  supplied by  the  notion  " essential to
the survival  of  society."  Where  one is looking  at  a simple society,
can  it  be  said  that  its  law  consists of  those  rules  whose  main-
tenance  is  essential  for  its  survival?  It  is  again  necessary  to
distinguish  between such rules as the  external  observer finds to  be
essential for  the survival  of  a particular  society, and such rules as
the  members of  the  society deem to  be essential for  its  survival.
If  one presents the  rules  devised by  an  external  observer as law,
one has to accept that  the members of  the society may themselves
not  be  conscious  of  these  rules.  On  this  view  there  may  be  a
significant  difference  between the  rules  which  constitute  the  law
of  the  society  and  the  rules  which  the  members  of  the  society
deem themselves to  be following.  On the  other  hand, an investiga-
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essential for  its survival  is also not  without  difficulty.  In  particular
the  investigator  may  find  that  the  members of  the  society do not
explicitly  use the notion  of  " essential for  survival "  as a criterion
by  which  one group  of  rules may  be distinguished  from  another .
Hence  he  will  be  forced  to  substitute  " most  important  "  for
" essential for  survival."
An  alternative  approach  is  to  concentrate  on  the  notion  of  a
rule as such, rather  than upon the division  of the class of  rules into
distinct  categories. From  this  point  of  view  it  may  be possible to
draw  a distinction  between rules and a wide range of  expectations
to  which  are attached  the  notion  of  " ought."  The  essence  of  the
distinction  lies  in  the  degree  of  prescription  conveyed  by  the
" ought."  In  the case of  a rule  the  " ought "  is mandatory.  Where
a  rule  states that  a  particular  form  of  behaviour  ought  to  be
followed,  those subject  to  the  rule  are required  to  behave in  the
way defined. Normally  compliance with  the requirement  is secured
through  the  availability  of  sanctions.  Indeed,  in  a  society  which
lacks a legislature  and a court,  it  is difficult  to  see how  one could
speak  of  behaviour  required  of  members  of  the  society  unless
sanctions to secure compliance are available and regularly  applied.
In  the  case of  an  expectation  one might  still  say that  behaviour
ought to be followed,  but  one would  not  go so far  as to say that  it
was prescribed or  required  or  mandatory.  Evidence that  behaviour
was regarded as the object of an expectation and not as a rule may
be  found  in  the  lack  of  sanctions.  Members  of  a  society  might
regard  certain  behaviour  as proper,  and  yet  there  might  exist  no
means  specifically  designed  to  ensure  that  the  behaviour  was
observed,  even  though  adverse reaction  such  as criticism  might
follow  upon a failure  to behave in the way expected.
An  illustration  may  be taken  from  J. M.  Meggitt's  account  of
the Walbiri,  an aboriginal  people of central Australia.8 He attributes
to  this  people  a  distinction  between an  obligation  entailed  by  a
particular  status, and  the  manner  in  which  such an  obligation  is
performed.  Failure  to  perform  the obligation  is treated as a break-
ing of  the law; performance  of the obligation  in an unusual way is
treated  as odd,  but  not  as a  breach  of  the  law.  The  difference
is reflected in the nature of the community's  reaction.  For  example,
a man  is under  an obligation  to  give meat to  his wife.  If  he fails
to do this he will  be physically  coerced by his wife's  male relations;
if  he gives her meat derived from  an improper  source (payment for
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a circumcision)  he will  be exposed to  ridicule  but  not  to  physical
pressure.
A  further  difference  between a rule  and  an  expectation  relates
to the content  of the behaviour  prescribed or  expected. In  a simple
society,  one would  not  say that  behaviour  was required  by  a rule
unless  there  was  general  agreement  on  the  specific  kind  of
behaviour  required.  This  does not  mean that  there  would  not  be
cases  in  which  it  was unclear  whether  the rule  applied or  not.  But
there  should  be a  clear  understanding  of  the  central  features  of
the  behaviour  required  by  the  rule.  Where  behaviour  is expected
but  not  prescribed,  there  may  also  be  a  clear  understanding
among  the  members of  the  society of  the  specific content  of  the
behaviour.  But  I  think  it  will  often  be the  case that  considerable
vagueness and flexibility  are found.  There  may  be an expectation
that  people should behave in  a proper  or  appropriate  way towards
their  kin.  But  what  in  a particular  instance is regarded as proper
or  appropriate  behaviour  may  be the  subject of  legitimate  doubt,
that  is,  there  may  be  a  wide  range  of  responses each of  which
arguably  qualifies  as  proper  or  appropriate.  There  will,  con-
sequently,  be  greater  scope  for  disagreement  about  whether
behaviour  conforms  to  what  is  expected  than  about  whether  it
complies with  what is prescribed.
Personally  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  an  approach  which  dis-
tinguishes between rules and other  " ought "  statements governing
human behaviour,9 and locates law in the former,  is the most fruit-
ful.  I  realise that  it  may not  be easy for  the anthropologist  investi-
gating a simple society to  discern whether  the behaviour  which  he
observes is the object  of  a rule  or  an expectation.  But  the attempt
to classify normatively-regarded  behaviour  in accordance with  such
a  distinction  seems to  me  a  more  realistic  enterprise  than  the
attempt  to  classify  rules  according  to  the  degree  of  their
importance.
An  important  point  still  needs to  be stressed. Such conclusions
as one reaches on the basis of  societies which  lack  legislatures and
courts  cannot  be  applied  to  societies  which  possess these  legal
institutions  and therefore  can be said to possess  legal systems. In  so
far  as one wishes to defend the conclusion that  the law of a society
is  those rules  which  regulate  human  behaviour,  one must  accept
that  it  is inapplicable  to  societies which  have legal systems. Once
9 I  am  not  considering  00  ought  ..statements  relating  to  the  behaviour  of  natural
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a  society  has developed specific  criteria  for  the  identification  of
rules  of  law  (for  example  by  means of  a law-enacting  or  a  law-
enforcing  body),  the  investigation  of  law  in  that  society is deter-
mined,  though  not  exclusively  so, by  the  boundaries  inherent  in
the criteria  of identification.
Although  I  have suggested that  anthropologists  in  their  studies
of  simple  societies have  not  always  distinguished  with  sufficient
care between rules and other " ought "  statements regarding human
behaviour,  I  think  that  they  do have a significant  contribution  to
make  with  respect  to  the  analysis  of  normatively-regarded
behaviour.  Not  until  anthropologists  have scrutinised  a number  of
societies from  this  point  of  view does it  seem possible to  say any-
thing  conclusive about the law of those societies. A  rather  different
type  of  contribution  that  anthropology  has to  make  is the  oppor-
tunity  it  provides  for  an  empirical  verification  of  some versions
of  natural  law  theory.lo  The  versions  I  have  in  mind  are  those
which  offer  a set of  rules  deduced by  reason and grounded  upon
the  natural  characteristics  of  man.  As  an  illustration  of  this
approach  I  have taken  the  version  of  natural  law  put  forward  by
Professor  Hart  in  The  Concept  of  Law,  which  in  turn  draws
heavily on the work  of Hobbes and Hume.11
In  offering  what he calls a description  of  " the minimum  content
of  natural  law,"  Professor Hart's  starting-point  has been the  use
of  reason in  establishing  conditions  relating  to  human  behaviour
which  must be met if  man as a species  is to survive. So far  as I  can
see, his argument  is that  man,  impelled  by  a wish to  survive,  has
reasons for  establishing  such  rules  of  behaviour  as are  necessary
to  ensure his  survival.  Since man  lives  in  groups,  these rules  are
those  which  permit  co-existence  within  the  group.  In  order  to
arrive  at  the  content  of  the  rules, Professor Hart  combines man's
wish  to  survive  and  certain  fundamental  facts  of  his  nature  and
environment  in  the  following  way.  The  fundamental  facts  are
human  vulnerability,  approximate  equality,  limited  altruism,
limited  resources and  limited  understanding  and  strength  of  will.
Of  these the  most  significant  is  the  " approximate  equality "  of
man  with  man.  No  individual  possesses  by  nature  such  physical
and mental superiority  over his fellows that  he is able to keep them
in a permanent state of subjection.  If  he is to live at peace with  his~
10 See  also  the  remarks  of  M.  Mead,  "  Some  Anthropological  Considerations  con-
cerning  Natural  Law  "  (1961) 6 Natural  Law  Forum  51.
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neighbours  and  so fulfil  his  wish  to  survive,  he  has to  pursue  a
policy  of  co-operation  and not  domination.  Man's  wish  to  survive,
together with  the fundamental  facts of his nature and environment,
supply reasons for  holding  that  men should adopt certain  rules in
their  relations  with  each  other.  Viewed  as a  whole  these  rules
constitute  what  Professor Hart  describes as " a system of  mutual
forbearance and compromise."
The rules constructed in this fashion by Professor Hart  relate  to
an  individual's  person,  property  and  promises.  There  should  be
rules which  prohibit  indiscriminate  killing  or  infliction  of  violence,
and rules which  ensure a man's peaceful enjoyment of his property.
The  latter  require  a  short  comment.  Professor  Hart  specifically
mentions rules which impose respect for  such property  as an indivi-
dual  acquires. He does not  say anything  about  rules which  ensure
the  more  or  less equal distribution  of  a group's  resources among
its members. Possibly one is entitled  to  infer  from  his remarks  on
" approximate  equality "  and  the  need for  " a  system of  mutual
forbearance  and compromise "  that  he would  have included  such
rules  in  " the  minimum  content  of  natural  law."  With  respect to
promises, Professor Hart's  argument  is that  the  division  of  labour
obtaining  in all  but  the smallest groups, together  with  the need for
co-operation,  supply  reasons for  the  development  of  rules  about
the  exchange of  goods and the  keeping  of  promises. Finally  Pro-
fessor Hart  adduces the  fact  that  men  are  prone  to  temptation
and to  prefer  their  own  interests to  those of  others.  In  this  may
be seen a reason for  the  establishment of  an organised system of
coercion,  to  ensure that  those willing  to  observe the  rules  of  the
society will  not  be  exploited  by  a  dissident  minority.  A  coercive
system is required  in all societies except small closely-knit  groups.
In  putting  forward  his version  of  natural  law,  Professor Hart  is
careful  not  to  commit  himself  to  any  particular  view  of  social
evolution,  or  to  a  view  which  treats  the  development  of  certain
rules  as necessarily  entailed  by  the  occurrence  of  certain  social
conditions.  He  concerns himself  merely  with  the  question:  given
certain facts about man's nature and environment,  what rules would
it  be rational  for  man to adopt, granted  that  he wishes to  survive?
Professor  Hart's  thesis allows  for  the  fact  that  men  in  any  par-
ticular  society  might  adopt  rules  which  are  not  rational,  and
certainly  this could be shown to be true  in  societies where the fact
of  " approximate  equality "  was not  the  dominant  characteristic.
In  societies where power is monopolised by a few,  it  is possible for
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the  rulers  to  govern  the  society  in  accordance  with  rules  that
would  conflict  with  Professor Hart's  " minimum  content  of  natural
law."  Those  with  the  power  may  be in  a  position  to  reserve for
themselves the  bulk  of  the  society's  resources and  to  treat  in  a
cavalier  fashion  the  persons and  property  of  those  who  do  not
have the power.
However,  in  societies where there  is no power structure  and no
monopoly  of power in the hands of a few, the dominant  character-
istic is the " approximate  equality "  of man with  man. Consequently
one would  expect  the  rules  adopted  by  the  members  of  such  a
society  to  be  those  for  whose  adoption  Professor  Hart  adduces
reasons. His  thesis  is  not  disproved  should  it  turn  out  that  the
members  of  a  society  have  adopted  rules  different  from  those
included  in  the  " minimum  content  of  natural  law ."  But  should it
be the case that  these societies commonly  adopt rules not  included
by Professor Hart  in  his account, or  commonly  do not  adopt rules
which  are  included,  the  thesis  loses  something  of  its  general
persuasiveness. One  might  be  able  to  put  the  position  more
strongly.  It  is  difficult  sometimes  to  resist  the  inference  that
Professor  Hart  does suppose there  to  be  a  necessary connection
between given social conditions and the adoption  of  certain  rules.12
That  is, it  seems to  be implied  in  his account  that  a society based
on " approximate  equality "  of  man with  man would  not  be viable
unless the  rules  which  he  specifies were  observed.  If  one  does
interpret  Professor Hart's  thesis as a thesis about  the  viability  of
societies  which  lack  power  structures,  it  is  possible  to  seek
verification  through  the  investigation  of  such societies which  have
existed in the past or still exist today.
Anthropological  studies of  simple societies, those without  power
structures,  are relevant  to  Professor  Hart's  thesis in  two  ways. If
one limits  the thesis to a statement of  rules derived by reason from
man's  wish  to  survive  and  certain  facts  about  his  nature  and
environment,  one may  assess  its  persuasiveness  against the  results
obtained by  anthropologists.  If  the  thesis is interpreted  as a state-
ment  of  the  rules relating  to  human  behaviour  which  a society of
this  type needs to  adopt,  its  accuracy can be verified  by  reference
to  these results.  The  former  interpretation  I  shall  call  version  A
and the latter  version B.
The  question is:  how  do versions A  and B  fare  in  the  light  of~
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data obtained from  the anthropological  studies of  simple societies?
Anthropologists  have  not  been  explicitly  concerned  to  prove  or
disprove theories  of  natural  law. Where  they  have been interested
in  law  they  have  concerned  themselves with  the  question:  what
counts as law within  a particular  society or range of  societies? Yet
the result  of  their  investigations is often  to  produce a list  of  rules
which  can be construed as necessary conditions  for  the  survival  of
the  human  group.13 In  many  other  writings  which  are not  specifi-
cally  concerned  with  law,  one  can  find  relevant  material.  From
studying accounts of a large number  of simple societies one is able
to  compile  modes of  behaviour  common  to  all.  Where  common
modes of  behaviour  are found,  the  suggestion appears reasonable
that  they  constitute  necessary conditions  for  the  survival  of  the
society.  14
The  first  proposition  that  may  be  asserted is  that  all  societies
without  power  structures  have a rule  prohibiting  one member  of
the  society from  killing  another .15  I  think  it  is reasonable to  state
the position  in  this apparently  dogmatic  manner.  A  full  discussion
of  the  topic  would  need to  investigate  such difficult  questions as
the  way  in  which  the  boundaries  of  the  society  or  group  were
to  be  drawn,  and  the  actual  attitudes  exhibited  in  particular
groups to  the killing  of  one member  by another.  For  my  purpose
I  hope  that  these questions may  be left  aside. It  also has to  be
recognised that  the  rule  prohibiting  killing  is frequently  qualified.
The group  accepts that  certain  categories of  person may  be killed
with  impunity.  Nevertheless in all simple societies, even those much
given  to  fighting  and  aggressive activities,  the  killing  of  one
member  by another  is regarded as wrong.  The  same attitude  may
not be taken to killings  which  occur between groups. There may be
no  rule  which  prohibits  the  members  of  one  group  from  killing
the members of  another,  at least where the groups are not  closely
connected  through  blood  or  marriage.  Thus  one  may  say  that
version B of the natural  law thesis receives confirmation  in  respect
of a rule  prohibiting  killing,  and that  what  version A  puts forward
as a rule derived from  reason is in fact observed.
13 Apart  from  the  works  of  Malinowski  cited  in  note  3, cf.  the  approach  to  law  taken
by  K.  N.  Llewellyn  and  E.  A.  Hoebel,  The  Cheyenne  Way,  Chaps.  10,  11;  and  M.  G.
Smith,  Corporations  and Society,  pp. 87 et seq., 94 et seq.
14 Colin  Turnbull's  study  of  the  Ik,  a  nomadic,  hunting  people  of  the  Sudan,  is
instructive:  The  Mountain  People.  He  shows how  a  prolonged  famine,  which  leads  to  a
policy  of  each  for  himself  and  a  breakdown  of  normal  family  and  communal  life,  is
causing the dissolution  of  the whole  society.
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Physical injuries  are not treated in quite the same way as killings.
They  naturally  give  rise  to  quarrels  and  provoke  retaliation,  and
there  may  be scales of  compensation applicable  to  different  types
of  injury.  But  at  least in  some societies the  infliction  of  an injury
is  not  treated  as a  serious  matter  unless it  is  likely  to  lead  to
death. 16  Consequently I think  it  doubtful  whether one can postulate
a rule  prohibiting  the infliction  of physical injury  as common to all
simple  societies.  As  against  version  B  it  cannot  be  said  that  a
general rule  prohibiting  violence is necessary for  the  viability  of  a
society or  group,  and with  respect to  version  A  it  has to  be said
that  there  are  societies in  which  men  have  not  appreciated  the
reasons for  adoption  of  a rule  prohibiting  violence in  general.
In  relation  to  resources, the most significant  point  that  emerges
is the  equal distribution  and the  emphasis on sharing to  be found
in  simple  societies.  17 For  example,  members  of  the  society  have
equal  opportunities  to  obtain  food.  There  is  commonly  found  a
great  deal  of  co-operative  activity  in  cultivating  crops,  gathering
roots,  nuts  and  berries,  herding  cattle  and  hunting  animals.  The
products  of  this  co-operative activity  are commonly  shared among
those taking  part  and their  kin.  Within  the group no one is allowed
to go without  food unless he is ejected from  it.  If  one were to speak
of  a  rule  or  rules  with  respect  to  resources,  I  think  that  the
formulation  would  be in  terms  of  a requirement  for  co-operation
in  obtaining  food  and for  sharing  what  was obtained.  Of  course
one could  say that  each was entitled  to  keep such food  as he was
allocated. But  it  seems  to me that  it  would  be a mistake to treat  as
primarya  rule  requiring  respect  for  property  acquired  by  the
individual.  The  emphasis should be placed not  on what  the  indivi-
dual  is entitled  to  keep, but  on what  he is expected to  share with
or  contribute  to  others.  Hence,  if  one were  considering  the  con-
ditions  necessary for  a viable society, one would  have to  include  a
rule  requiring  co-operation  and sharing  with  respect to  resources,
even though  one  were  not  disposed to  exclude  a  rule  requiring
respect for  property  obtained  by  an  individual.  Likewise,  if  one
16 See W.  Goldschmidt,  Sebei Law,  Chap.  8.
17 A  great  deal  of  material  on  food  sharing  has  been  collected  by  Marshall  Sahlins
in  the  appendices  to  "  On  the  Sociology  of  Primitive  Exchange,"  in  M.  Banton,  The
Relevance  of  Models  for  Social  Anthropology,  p.  139.  Much  variation  is  found  in  the
degree of  co-operation  and  sharing  practised  in  simple  societies.  In  most  there  seems to
have  been  considerable  emphasis  on  co-operation  but  some  appear  to  have  been  more
"  individualistic."  But  even  in  these  support  and  help  ,vere  given  to  those  in  need.
Cf.  R.  Landes,  "  The  Ojibwa  of  Canada,"  in  M.  Mead,  Co-operation  and  Competition
among  Primitive  Peoples,  p.  87.  The  other  essays in  this  volume  also  contain  relevant
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were thinking  of rules for  the adoption of which  good reasons could
be  advanced, the  rule  about  co-operation  and  sharing  should  be
included.
Promises and organised sanctions form  part  of  Professor Hart's
" minimum  content  of  natural  law,"  though  their  inclusion  is
subject  to  qualifications  not  made  in  connection  with  the  rules
concerning  person and  property.  One of  the  facts  that  supplies a
reason for  the keeping of  promises is the division  of  labour,  a fact
not  present in  the  smallest  groups.  Consequently  Professor  Hart
allows  for  the  fact  that  in  some groups  there  may  not  exist  a
reason for  the  keeping  of  promises. One problem  in  assessing  this
argument  is the  vagueness of  the  phrase " division  of  labour."  In
all  groups there  is at  least a division  of  labour  between man  and
woman  and  adult  and  child.  It  is  only  if  one restricts  the  notion
of division  of labour  to work  undertaken  by men, that  one may say
many  simple  societies have  no  division  of  labour  and  therefore,
on  Professor  Hart's  argument,  no  reason for  the  development  of
a rule  requiring  the keeping  of  promises. As will  be seen, on both
interpretations  difficulties  are created for  Professor Hart's  thesis.
The anthropological  evidence shows that  neither  the most simple
societies  nor  sometimes  even  those  that  technologically  and
politically  are more advanced have explicit  rules about the keeping
of  promises. This  does not  mean that  promises or  agreements are
not  made, or  that,  when  made, they  are never  kept.  Nor  does it
mean that  a person who fails  to  do what  he has said he would  do
incurs no censure. Occasionally, indeed, the matter  can be put more
strongly.  Among  the Ifugao  a person who makes a promise to  sell
land is held to be bound by the promise, and to be liable in damages
where he had been the first  to broach the matter  with  the prospec-
tive  buyer.'s  One notes, however,  that  even here it  is only  within
strictly  defined  conditions  that  a  promise  is  held  to  create  an
enforceable  obligation.  The  point  is that  promises as such do not
playa  significant  role  in  simple societies. Accordingly,  one cannot
say that  these societies have a rule  that  promises should be kept.
The  reason  is  that  emphasis  is  placed  upon  something  more
tangible,  namely  the  giving  and  receipt  of  property.  People  are
expected  to  give  to  others,  not  because they  have  promised  or
agreed to give, but because of the relationship  of blood or marriage
which  exists between them.  This  expectation,  and often  one might
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be able to describe it  as an obligation,  is reinforced  by the  " obliga-
tion "  to make a return  for  what has been received.19
If  all  simple societies are held to have division  of  labour,  at least
in  the  sense that  the  men  do  different  work  from  the  women,
version  B  of  Professor  Hart's  thesis  requires  modification  and
version  A  becomes less cogent.  If  Professor  Hart  were  right  in
arguing  that  reason suggests the  development  of  a rule  about  the
keeping of  promises, it  is at least odd that  no society characterised
primarily  by  the  fact  of  " approximate  equality "  should  have
appreciated  and  acted  upon  reason.  If  the  notion  of  division  of
labour  is applied  only  to  work  undertaken  by  men,  many  simple
societies  can  be  held  to  have  no  division  of  labour.  In  these
societies there  is, on Professor Hart's  argument,  no reason for  the
development of a rule requiring  that promises be kept. The evidence
supports this  conclusion. But  there  remains a difficulty.  There  are
societies in  which  the  men  specialise and  perform  different  tasks
and yet no  clear rules about  the  keeping  of  promises are found.2°
If,  as I  suspect, quite a number  of  such societies have existed, one
would  again have the oddity  of  a widespread failure  to  appreciate
the reason for  the adoption of a rule requiring  promises to be kept.
A  further  difficulty  also arises on  this  interpretation.  The  " mini-
mum  content  of  natural  law "  is constructed  by  reference  to  two
types  of  group:  that  with  and  that  without  division  of  labour.
Why should the inquiry  be restricted to just these groups?
In  so far  as Professor Hart  distinguishes between small,  closely-
knit  groups which  lack  organised sanctions and other  groups which
require  them,  the  same objection  may  be  taken.  If  one  is  con-
structing  a  " minimum  content  of  natural  law "  on  the  basis of
fundamental  facts  of  human  nature,  it  is  not  easy to  see why
groups  other  than  the  simplest  which  allows  for  the  survival  of
man  should  be relevant.  The  simplest  societies in  fact  cannot  be
said to  operate  organised sanctions or  systems of  coercion.  They
do have sanctions, in  the  sense that  people who  do not  behave in
the  way  prescribed by  rules  are subjected to  physical  compulsion
or  other  forms  of  pressure specifically  designed to  ensure com-
pliance  or  to  impose a punishment  for  breach. But  such sanctions
are  imposed  by  various  persons related  to  the  offender  or  the
19 Some of  the  relevant  literature  is mentioned  in  my  article  on  "  Reciprocity  "  (1976)
II  Man  (N.S.) 89.
20 Cf.  M.  Gluckman's  discussion  of  contract  among  the  Lozi:  The  Ideas  in  Barotse
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victim,  or  sometimes by  members of  the  group  as a whole.  They
are  not  activated  by  a  particular  person  or  body  whose duty  it
is to  institute  sanctions under defined circumstances. On the  other
hand, what  the  simplest societies do all  possess  is some procedure
for  the  settlement  of  disputes.  Each  society  needs to  evolve  or
practise some means by which  disputes between its  members may
be contained  or  settled.  No  group  can  be  viable  unless it  has a
means of  permitting  the  continuation  of  co-operation  despite the
occurrence  of  disputes. And  if  one  is  thinking  of  rules  for  the
conduct  of  life  suggested by  reason on the  basis of  " approximate
equality,"  rules providing  procedures for  the settlement of  disputes
have a stronger  claim  on one's attention  than  rules  establishing a
system of  organised coercion.21 The  point  is  that  once a  society
develops an  organisation  for  the  infliction  of  sanctions  a  power
structure  emerges and the natural  fact  of  " approximate  equality "
ceases  to be of primary  importance.
In  general,  consideration  of  the  anthropological  evidence
suggests  that  version B of Professor Hart's  thesis requires modifica-
tion  and  that  version  A  loses something  of  its  persuasiveness,
since members of  simple societies have not  always appreciated the
reasons said to  stem from  man's  wish  to  survive  and  the  funda-
mental  facts of  his nature  !ind environment.  I  do not  want  to  say
anything  further  of the relevance of anthropology  to the particular
thesis presented by  Professor Hart.  But  I  should like  to  pose two
questions  which  require  answers  if  one  attempts  generally  to
utilise  the  results obtained  by  anthropologists  for  the  construction
of  a  " minimum  content  of  natural  law."  The  first  question  con-
cerns  the  distinction  between  rules  observed by  members  of  the
same group  and rules observed by members of  different  groups in
their  dealing  with  each other.  On  the  basis of  studies made  by
anthropologists,  one may be able to  construct  a set of  rules which
needs to be observed by the members of  a group if  the group is to
survive.  An  argument  that  these  rules  constitute  " a  minimum
content  of  natural  law "  has to  meet the  objection  that  the  rules
have a restricted  ambit.  They  apply  only  to  members of  a group
in their  dealings with  each other.  How  can they be relevant  where
one is considering relationships between groups? A  possible line  of
argument  is  the  following.  Just  as life  within  the  group  can  be
maintained  only  if  certain  rules  are  observed, so can  the  group
21 In  some societies,  as in  a number  of  those  found  in  Papua  and  New  Guinea,  it  is
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itself,  once  it  has come  into  contact  with  other  groups,  survive
only if  it  is able to apply similar  rules to  its relationship  with  these
groups.  For  example,  as  between  groups  indiscriminate  killing
has to be avoided, and in so far  as they are competing for  the same
resources the  distribution  must  be  more  or  less equal.  If  these
conditions  are not  observed, in  the  long  run  one or  perhaps both
groups will  break  up and their  members either  die or  merge with
another group or found  a new group.
The  second question concerns the nature  of  the data utilised  by
the  person wishing  to  construct  a  " minimum  content  of  natural
law."  Is it  the behaviour  alone which  is relevant,  or  is it  the  rules
observed by  the  members  of  the  groups?  Does  the  investigator
argue that  everywhere members of  the  groups studied refrain  on
the  whole  from  killing  each other,  and that  therefore  everywhere
man ought to  refrain  from  killing  man?  Or  does he argue that  all
groups  studied  accept  a  rule  that  members  should  refrain  from
killing  each other, and that  therefore  such a rule  forms  part  of  the
minimum  content  of  natural  law?  In  fact  the  investigator  will
have to  adopt both  approaches. He  has to  start  by  looking  at  the
way  members  of  the  groups  actually  behave. In  so far  as he  is
able  to  isolate  behaviour  common  to  all  groups,  he  will  find  it
impossible  to  separate  the  question  of  what  is  done  from  the
question of  what  ought to be done. Members of  the group practise
the  behaviour  because they  regard it  as behaviour  which  ought  to
be practised.  One  might  press the  investigation  further,  and  ask
why  they  attach  an  " ought "  to  the  behaviour,  but  the  answer
does not seem to be relevant to the construction  of a set of natural
laws.  What  is  relevant  is  the  investigator's  conviction  that  the
behaviour  is necessary  for  the survival  of the group.22  *
G.  MACCORMACK
22 I  am  most  grateful  to  my  colleague  Dr.  M.  Dalgarno,  for  his  searching  criticisms
of an earlier  version  of  this paper .
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